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June 1, 1971

If We Immigrate to Israel, We Are Bound to Incite the Panthers' Bitterness

For many centuries Jews not only from Europe but also from across all of what we now call the Middle East trickled to Eretz Israel/Palestine, most importantly to Jerusalem. Moreover, in the mid-nineteenth century, the leading proto-Zionist thinker Rabbi Judah Alkalai (1798 [Sarajevo]-1878 [Jerusalem]) was a Sephardi, i.e. a Jew whose family was originally from Sepharad, Spain, and ended up in the Ottoman Empire after being expulsed in the fifteenth century. And when in the later nineteenth century Zionism arose, it found some followers in the Middle East, too.

Despite all the above, Zionism’s political-ideological epicenter was the Russian, German, and Austro-Hungarian Empires. Whether left- or right-wing or liberal, Zionist parties were led by European-born Jews (who were quite diverse, though). And while Jews from Middle Eastern countries continued to arrive in Palestine in the very late Ottoman period (1516/17-1917/18) and the British Mandate (1917/22-1948), most Jewish immigrants were from Europe. This changed only after and due to the Holocaust, in which about two out of three European Jews were killed. In the early postwar Americas and Western Europe, relatively few Jews wished to emigrate, and the Soviet Union, which after World War II replaced Poland as the European country with the largest Jewish population, forbade emigration.

Hence, the government of Prime Minister David Ben Gurion (1886-1968; r. 1948-1954/1955-1963) expanded initiatives—in some cases “helped” by Arab nationalist pressures on domestic Jews—to bring to Israel the ‘edot ha-mizrah, the (Middle) Eastern communities, a plural that would morph into the collective mizrahim. After all, Israel in 1948 counted “only” about 700,000 Jews. While many middle- and upper-class Jews e.g. from Morocco and Egypt left for Europe, a large majority—but far from all—of those Israel-bound emigrants were poor. As if this did not make starting a new life hard enough, the relatively poor newly-found State of Israel was overwhelmed by the ensuing population explosion. Worst, however, was systemic institutional and individual discrimination, analyzed e.g. in Ella Shohat’s classic article “Sephardim in Israel: Zionism from the standpoint of its Jewish victims” (1988). Yes: the Palestinians who had remained in Israel after the nakba had it worse, for the Jewish State did not treat them as full citizens, even subjecting them to military rule until 1966. But in the eyes of most Middle Eastern Jewish immigrants, this was cold comfort.

Protests occurred from the 1950s. They took a new turn in February 1971, when poor Jerusalemites, many with a petty criminal record and most from Morocco, founded the Black Panthers (BP), organizing demonstrations and asserting that their communities had “enough of deprivation [and] enough of discrimination.” Although the Panthers would have a limited long-term effect politically—only one, Charlie Bitton (born 1947), would go on to have a lasting political career, as a communist member of parliament—socially, they did. The government reacted not only with repression but also by increasing social services; besides, the Panthers helped bring different Middle Eastern Jewish communities closer. For our purposes most crucial, though, is the Panthers’ choice of name. While they did not too often refer to their US namesakes and never to leaders like Huey Newton (1942-1989), their name reflected the influence on Israel of US developments, as Oz Frankel’s “The Black Panthers of Israel and the Politics of Radical Analogy” (2012) argues. And although the Israeli Panthers shared neither the Americans’ separatist nationalism—they wanted fully in, not out—nor their use of arms nor their support for Palestine, calling themselves Panthers shocked Israel’s Ashkenazi (European) establishment. It presumably harmed Israel’s reputation, also by the hand of Arabs. Moreover, by the late 1960s Israelis and some US Jews believed that most African Americans had become anti-Semitic.

The text featured here, an English translation of a Hebrew article published in the leading daily Yediot Aharonot, reflects some of these intricate international dimensions of the rise of Israel’s Panthers.

July 1963

D.B., 'To the New Comer'

While in 1947 the Indian organizers of the First Asian Relations Conference invited a Yishuvi delegation, eight years later the Bandung Conference organizers did not invite Israel. At the same time, the second half of the 1950s signaled the start of Israel’s long “African Decade,” which would end only when many African states cut their diplomatic ties with the Jewish State after the 1973 October War. The first two countries to establish diplomatic ties with Israel were Ethiopia, in 1956, and Liberia, in 1957; in the 1960s, many others followed, including Benin, Burkina Faso, Congo, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Tanzania.

Thousands of Africans studied in Israel, as illustrated by this document, an anonymous article published in 1963 in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem’ African Students journal that provides a glimpse of experiences Africans had, including racism but also feelings of superiority. Moreover, thousands of Israeli engineers, agronomists, architects, geologists and others who had participated in nation-state building in Israel worked often for years in development projects in Africa and also, though less so, in Asia and Latin America. And as Ronen Bergman’s 2007 PhD thesis “Israel and Africa: Military and Intelligence Liaisons” shows, Israel exported weaponry and Israeli officers shared with the militaries of recently decolonized African countries their expertise in warfare and in controlling civilians. After all, Israel blitzed through the Egyptian Sinai in 1956, had won its first war back in 1948-1949, and from then until 1966 kept its own Palestinian citizens under military rule.

In fact, the Israeli Defense Forces and the foreign intelligence agency Mossad were central to Israel’s involvement in Africa. The core reason for Israel’s interest in Africa was political and strategic. Israel needed allies in the United Nations, where postcolonial Asian countries were turning against it. And it wished to minimize the dangers of postcolonial Arab-African alliances and to extend to parts of Africa its “periphery doctrine” of honing relations with Middle Eastern countries that neighbor Arab states, like Iran and Turkey. As it did so, Israel at times shared some contacts and information with the US government; becoming a US asset was a boon to the Israeli government, though it remained fiercely independent-minded.

September 15, 1985

Cable No. 769, Ambassador Kato to the Foreign Minister, 'Ambassador Nakayama's Visit to Syria'

A summary of the meeting between Foreign Minister Shara of Syria and Special Envoy Nakayama about the relationship between Japan and Syria and the American hostages in Lebanon. The two discuss how the release of the Lebanese prisoners in Israel influences the situation of the American hostages.

September 13, 1985

Cable No. 469, Foreign Minister to the Ambassador to Syria Kato, 'Problem of the Release of the American Hostages (Special Envoy Nakayama’s Visit to Syria)'

In this telegram the Foreign Minister of Japan instructs Ambassador to Syria Kato to prepare for a second visit regarding the American hostages held in Lebanon from Special Envoy Nakayama.

September 12, 1985

First Middle East Division Director, 'Main Points of Remarks and Questions and Answers for Special Envoy Nakayama (for President Assad and Foreign Minister Shara)'

A summary of the main points Special Envoy Nakayama will state in a meeting with Syrian government officials. Nakayama urges Syria to continue advocating for the release of the American hostages in Lebanon, citing the recent release of the Lebanese prisoners in Israel as motivation to continue.

August 5, 1985

Cable No. 394, Foreign Minister to the Ambassador to Syria, 'Problem of the Release of the American Hostages (Main Points of Remarks, Questions and Answers for Prime Minister’s Special Envoy)'

A draft telegram from the Foreign Minister of Japan to the Ambassador to Syria that discusses the main points for discussion regarding the Special Envoy Nakayama’s visit to Syria. The document discusses the release of the American hostages in Lebanon and the TWA Flight 847 hijacking incident of 1985.

August 5, 1985

Cable No. 394, Foreign Minister to the Ambassador to Syria, 'Problem of the Release of the American Hostages (Main Points of Remarks, Questions and Answers for Prime Minister’s Special Envoy)'

A telegram from the Foreign Minister of Japan to the Ambassador to Syria preparing for Special Envoy Nakayama’s visit to Syria.

September 27, 1985

Summary of Remarks for Use in Meeting of Japanese and Syrian Foreign Ministers at the United Nations

In the notes for a meeting between Japanese and Syrian Foreign Ministers at the UN, Japan urges Syria to continue assisting in the release of the American hostages and assures Syria they are putting pressure on Israel to release the Lebanese hostages held in Israel.

September 27, 1985

Cable No. 2483, Ambassador Kuroda to the Foreign Minister, '40th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Meeting of Japanese and Syrian Foreign Ministers)'

In this telegram, Ambassador Kuroda of Japan summarizes the main points of a meeting between Japanese and Syrian foreign ministers where they discuss the growing friendship between Japan and Syria, the American hostages in Lebanon, and Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir’s visit to Japan.

September 26, 1985

Cable No. 2459, Ambassador Kuroda to the Foreign Minister, 'Meeting of Japanese Foreign Minister and US Secretary of State (Shamir's Visit to Japan)'

This telegram to the Foreign Minister from Ambassador Kuroda of Japan summarizes US Secretary of State Shultz and Minister Abe’s options on a recent visit to Japan by Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir.

Pagination